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Euro bank account (IBAN)

A company gets a euro IBAN. A SEPA transfer to it arrives as EURC in the company wallet, the address the vault controls, and from there it moves only as a role allows or the members vote. The partner is Noah (Business API, virtual IBANs held at OpenPayd).

Who opens it an owner of the company, once, with the company’s legal details (KYB), in Treasury → Euro bank account
Where the euros go the company wallet only: the API reads its address from the vault on NEAR (get_wallet) and never takes it from the request; if the partner answers with another address, nothing is saved (destination_mismatch)
What arrives EURC on Base (sandbox: EURC_TEST on Base Sepolia, 0x623ef90571256F905B2Fde947dC33098BdD8F4d8)
How it leaves like any company money: a payment role with an EURC budget, or a transaction the members vote
Keys the Noah API key stays on the server (NOAH_API_KEY); the company wallet still has no private key
Code apps/api/src/bank/ (client, service, tests), apps/console/src/routes/BankAccountCard.tsx

On testnet (Noah sandbox, Base Sepolia), 2026-11-07

Section titled “On testnet (Noah sandbox, Base Sepolia), 2026-11-07”

Run: NOAH_API_KEY=… DATABASE_URL=… VAULT=<vault> pnpm --filter @euthyna/api exec tsx scripts/bank-sandbox-e2e.ts.

Step Result Proof
Open the account for testdao4ai.euthyna-nomos.testnet IBAN MT22 CFTE 1987 0000 0000 9001 0358 449, settles into 0x1be62b8a…8e1d, read from the vault bank-sandbox-e2e.ts
A SEPA transfer of 20 EUR (sandbox simulation) 19.71 EURC in the company wallet, about 30 s later (1 % fee) Base Sepolia 0x569f9cead0e810b69bb1b05bf65780bb1f33a9fe50a34691c81574e0c7e5e2da
Same for sealedprod1106.nomos.euthyna.testnet 19.71 EURC in 0x8b22b9fa…9de6 Base Sepolia 0x794330f7d92b2f8f377591eb9630522a2d2d07e3a88f97147ffda7f45cdce864
The members of sealedprod1106 vote to pay 5 EURC to a supplier from those euros proposal #13, approved by two of three; scheduled by the vault NEAR 7eqYU8we8uCAZ7jVbfzMHi3Q8ibdZw6uBo8Jt6STNdrn, FMKS3Ty1zjSGSSbUjZco9j4EVa3mGtswGZxfyTuhToDF
After the veto window the API starts it, NEAR MPC signs it for the vault, the worker broadcasts it 5 EURC received by the supplier (0x1be62b8a…8e1d): 19.71 → 24.71 Base Sepolia 0xc45d7ea2a864c590e9f23eb2abfb173d0189eb4587f9abaddd15aa5b4c768470 (vault operation f8643bfc…e027, wallet nonce 8); started by the API Bjv1TApifuxda22Fkq5gLsAvvhepJxrPhwkCTRgpUKQ2, settled by the worker from the MPC attestation of the finalized Base block, state Confirmed
The worker settles it on the vault budget and nonce closed on NEAR, about 25 min after the transfer (Base finality) NEAR Cix2CioqhiKRc3UANU8zxsBctqZbq5bbuNnNxdUXiZME
An agent of sealedprod1106 (treasury-desk, ceiling 50 EUR, 100 EUR a day, all voted) pays an IBAN that was not voted refused by the vault: BeneficiaryNotAllowed; 70 EUR to the voted IBAN: ERR_MAX_PER_PAYOUT check_bank_payout
The members vote the borrowed customer id of another account (SetBankConfig, proposal #21) and the agent pays refused in the enclave: the customer is not this vault's; budget and reference given back NEAR FiG8TyWU8Aaswhf7SHKPLY9URLCMABjxphYkMugJF2QL
With the vault’s own customer (proposal #22), the agent pays 5 EUR to Atelier Dupont SAS (FR76 3000 6000 0112 3456 7890 189) the enclave signs the partner’s single-use rule ba917604-…; the vault queues 5 EURC; NEAR MPC signs it; the partner pays 4.78 EUR to the IBAN NEAR fwwpChrpcwKewsBGLz7sF93o7UukUQc3qEC9FtSwBQC, Base Sepolia 0x0eef2dd1f229f0f0d7731a383df2176426d6b8b7113a591046a186817010c8e6
Sealed beneficiaries (proposal #25: new signer, box key, beneficiary #1 “Supplier A”, sealed in the SDK as a browser does): the agent pays beneficiary #1 6 EUR; #2, never voted, is refused (BeneficiaryNotAllowed) the enclave opens the envelope, checks the commitment and pays 5.73 EUR to the IBAN; the vault’s bank:* state, proposal #25, the agent’s transaction with its OutLayer input and output hold no IBAN and no name (searched) NEAR DeZp8uT96RTWWFfHmiikZtEHEtXreUrSVf5nTAtqYgoF, Base Sepolia 0xb5d30de698c77c53fe3d91acd30a190ed687d657ca1b319e451466d3c0e948a5

The question with a bank partner is who can change where the money goes. A payout address at the partner is tied to an IBAN by whoever holds the partner API key; the vault cannot see that binding. So the partner’s API key must answer to the vault, and to nothing else:

agent ──request_bank_payout──▶ vault (NEAR) ──request_execution──▶ OutLayer (Intel TDX)
│ IBAN in the voted list? │ bank-signer wasm
│ amount ≤ ceiling, ≤ budget? │ holds Noah's key
│ reference unused? │ answers only a vault
◀──────── deposit address ────────────┘ single-use rule at Noah
│
└─ EURC transfer to that address, signed by NEAR MPC
(queued like a voted transaction) ──▶ Noah pays the IBAN
The rule RuleChange::AddBankBeneficiary (IBAN, holder name, checksum verified), SetBankPermission (role, EURC budget, ceiling per payout), SetBankConfig (which signer code, which secrets); all voted by the DAO, queued and vetoable like any rule
The check request_bank_payout(role, iban, amount, reference) in contracts/vault/src/bank.rs: paused, role enabled, membership active, beneficiary listed, amount within ceiling and budget, reference unused, one payout at a time; the budget is reserved before anything leaves
The signer bank-signer/: a WASI component run by OutLayer in an Intel TDX enclave. Its manifest denies direct, HTTPS and meta-transaction callers; its secret row (profile noah) is readable only by that exact WASM hash and only when the predecessor is a vault (*.euthyna-nomos.testnet, *.nomos.euthyna.testnet); the code itself refuses unless OUTLAYER_EXECUTION_TYPE=NEAR and the caller is the vault named in its input. Noah’s request-signing key (P-256) is derived in the enclave from a PROTECTED_ seed generated there; the API key attached to that public key refuses unsigned requests (HTTP 401)
Whose account the partner customer is derived from the vault: eut- + 38 hex of sha256(vault account). The enclave refuses any other id, so a vault cannot pay out under another company’s KYB by voting its customer id; the API opens accounts under the same id (customerIdOf)
What the signer does POST /transactions/sell/prepare (the IBAN, the name, the reference, EURC → EUR) and POST /workflows/onchain-deposit-to-payment-method with a single-use trigger: this source address, exactly this amount, before this expiry (24 h), nonce = the payout id. It answers the deposit address and the rule id; it cannot widen anything the vault decided
The transfer on_bank_signer builds transfer(deposit, amount) on the EURC token and queues it as a Scheduled operation of the agent’s role (the role’s delay applies above its threshold, the council can veto); the same worker that broadcasts voted transactions signs it through NEAR MPC and settles it. A refusal or a signer failure gives the budget, the membership use and the reference back
Agents MCP bank_payout / bank_status; mandate shows the role’s bank block (voted IBANs, ceiling, budget)
Members Settings → suppliers (add or remove an IBAN by vote), Treasury → Euro payouts (enable, who may pay, history); Activity shows each payout as one row with its Base transaction

Nothing on chain names the IBAN or its holder: not the vault’s state, the DAO proposal, the agent’s transaction, the OutLayer input or output, nor the payout records. A member’s browser seals the beneficiary (packages/sdk/src/bank-private.ts) and our server never receives the IBAN either:

On chain What it is
#1, Supplier A the beneficiary’s number, and a public label the members choose (never a name)
commitment sha256(“euthyna-bank-beneficiary-v1” 0 vault 0 IBAN 0 holder 0 type 0 salt); the 32-byte random salt keeps an IBAN from being found by trying candidates
sealed_for_signer X25519 to the enclave’s box key, AES-256-GCM, the vault’s account as associated data: only that enclave opens it, and only for this vault
sealed_for_members the same beneficiary for the members’ reading keys (derived from a signature of their own wallet, the sealed orders’ scheme); the console checks it against the commitment

The agent pays bank_payout(beneficiary: 1, …). The vault forwards the envelope and the commitment; the enclave opens the envelope, recomputes the commitment and pays only that IBAN, otherwise it refuses (the beneficiary is not the one the members voted). Its output and its errors name neither the IBAN nor the holder. The vault refuses an IBAN in clear (ERR_BANK_CLEARTEXT_IBAN), and voting the box key or a sealed beneficiary erases the first version’s clear records from its state.

Still public: the amount (an EURC transfer on Base), the reference (an invoice number, never personal data) and that beneficiary #1 was paid. Past states stay on archival nodes: the IBAN used on testnet before this change (FR76 3000 6000 0112 3456 7890 189, the standard example IBAN) is in that history.

The company issues an invoice (Treasury → Invoices): a number (INV-2026-0001), a creditor reference (ISO 11649, RF…, unique across companies) and a SEPA QR code (EPC069-12, the “GiroCode”) that any European banking app scans to fill the IBAN, the amount and the reference. Print it as PDF from the console. The customer pays by SEPA; the bank partner reports the reference with the deposit (its FiatDeposit webhook, signed with ECDSA P-384 and verified with the partner’s key: anything unsigned or forged is refused, and a reference only counts on the invoice’s own company account). The invoice turns paid once the euros are in the company wallet as EURC, with the Base hash: the partner’s transfer to the wallet carries the deposit as its orchestration (RuleExecutionID). A partial payment leaves it open. CSV export for the accountant. Invoices live in our database (invoice), not on chain.

Set up once: in the Noah dashboard (API → Webhooks → Create), URL https://euthyna.io/v1/webhooks/noah, event FiatDeposit. In the sandbox, “Simulate payment” pays an invoice with its reference.

Step (Noah sandbox, sealedprod1106, 2026-11-07) Result Proof
Issue INV-2026-0002, 18 EUR reference RF21INV2026000246EF79, SEPA QR BCD/002/1/SCT/CFTEMTM1XXX/…/MT04CFTE19870000000090010358482/EUR18.00//RF21INV2026000246EF79/ scripts/invoice-sandbox-e2e.ts
The customer pays it by SEPA with the reference paid in about 15 s: 17.66 EURC in the company wallet (0x8b22…9de6), the invoice shows the hash Base Sepolia 0x5ac9127b430b3f6988a615c5d5d8070128937487d04be5e342b721daace0c280

Any rail. A beneficiary can be on any payout rail of the partner, still sealed: SEPA (EUR), Pix (Brazil, BRL), ACH (US, USD), Faster Payments (UK, GBP). The console fills the partner’s payout form for that rail (RAILS in bank-private.ts); the envelope carries the partner’s channel and that form, and the commitment covers both (v2: sha256 over the vault, the channel, the form as canonical JSON and the salt). The enclave sends the form as is and redacts every value from its errors. The company pays in EURC; the partner converts to the payee’s currency.

Standing orders. The members vote once: “beneficiary #2, 2 400 EUR, every 30 days, from the 28th, 12 times” (AddStandingOrder). On each date anyone may call run_standing_order (the API’s keeper does, with the voted transactions); the vault pays exactly that beneficiary and amount, with no agent and no role budget: the vote is the authorisation. A failed run goes back to its date; removing the beneficiary cancels its orders; RemoveStandingOrder stops one. Console: Treasury → Payroll.

What stays public: the amounts (EURC transfers on Base), the dates, the payee’s number and label. Not public: who is paid, their account, their name.

Step (sealedprod1106, 2026-11-07) Result Proof
Members vote the multi-rail signer and three sealed payees: #2 SEPA (Supplier A), #3 Pix (Contractor BR), #4 UK (Employee UK) (proposal #28) the vote holds no account, name or Pix key (searched) NEAR AtRL56Fr…, AxyE2d7L…, E9H21SVh…
Remittance: the agent pays beneficiary #3 8 EUR the enclave opens the Pix payee; the partner pays 74.92 BRL by Pix NEAR 55asfnwkUuYhSpVHUAz6vfNfAi1VwcNxxm8knFQUX5wz, Base Sepolia 0x52c92ea608e46dbf81a20b6ffac8015fe60941c14cb252e31a79e23900e4fd38
A payroll order to #4 (UK) runs the partner refuses: its UK channel is not open for this sandbox customer (channel policy denied); nothing leaves, the order goes back to its date NEAR AhEAMQ8w8QujufmzgUCvR3wnr8syeXmKia2aiwcSqgXf
Payroll: the members vote “beneficiary #2, 3 EUR every 10 minutes, twice” (proposal #30); on its date anyone runs it the vault pays without an agent or a new vote; the partner pays 2.87 EUR by SEPA; the order moves to its next date NEAR DoqJPecfqL17M79cTynbo8CfKZ2b9fdZ25Q6Lf3GyVgR, Base Sepolia 0xac6cee06e326fcf1dde882e259c7b9c83703a3999265d5c61c08263c532c282c
Ten minutes later, its second and last run paid again (2.87 EUR by SEPA); the order is done and leaves the list NEAR 7LVAzz4b1cuzMPuwqbnYkQDXJQXiQSuRc8eyMXBptDd9, Base Sepolia 0x5d129ca66caa25066fad9650e3361aab80995a2e7474ec689465cd0399a28005

What the vault guarantees, and what it does not

Section titled “What the vault guarantees, and what it does not”
  • Guaranteed on chain: no IBAN outside the voted list, no amount above the ceiling or the budget, no reference twice, no payout while the role is disabled or the vault paused. These are the vault’s checks, before the signer is even called.
  • Guaranteed by the enclave: the partner’s API key answers only to a vault’s call with the exact WASM the members voted (signer_hash); nobody, including us, can use it from a laptop. Changing the signer code means a new hash, which a vault takes only by a vote or, if it follows the enclave project, after its veto window (below).
  • Not guaranteed: the partner’s execution (Noah pays the IBAN off chain; the vault sees its own EURC leave and the partner’s rule id), and the partner’s own honesty. The audit trail is the vault payout record, the OutLayer execution and the partner’s transaction.

Enclave updates: one vote, or none with a veto window

Section titled “Enclave updates: one vote, or none with a veto window”

The enclave runs from an OutLayer project (euthyna-ops.testnet/bank-signer). The project’s secrets row is shared by its versions and locked to the builds it names, so a fixed enclave keeps its generated seed: the same partner key, the same box key, no beneficiary to seal again. The vault still runs exactly one hash: OutLayer is called with Project { project_id, version_key: signer_hash }.

  • SetBankSignerSource { project, follow } (voted once). With follow, anyone may call follow_bank_signer(): the vault reads the project’s active version and queues it as an ordinary SetBankConfig rule, so it applies after the vault’s rule delay unless a council member vetoes it. A version is queued once: a vetoed one does not come back. The keeper calls it.
  • Without follow, each version is a vote, as before.
  • Release: build, upload, outlayer deploy bank-signer <url>, then node bank-signer/scripts/sandbox-twice.mjs (each rail paid twice to the same payee against the partner’s sandbox: the check that would have caught the Pix bug), admit the new hash next to the old one (update_access), and drop the old one once the vaults run the new one.

Proof on sealedprod1106 (2026-11-08): vault f8b6bebb… (proposal #38); enclave 0.2.0 e11f11df… from the project, payees resealed, follow on (proposal #39); Pix paid twice to the same payee (DAhG79sZ…, DuhwL86p…, 46.93 BRL each) and SEPA once (548ZoeUn…, 4.78 EUR). Then 0.2.1 6b0d3046… activated in the project: follow_bank_signer queued it with no vote (GStmvBGe…), applied after the 5-minute window (Fn2TA9Yb…), and Pix paid a third time with the same partner key and the same sealed payee (HuQaXsrj…, 48.25 BRL).

The Pix bug it fixed: the partner saves a payee on its first payout, then refuses its form (“selected payment method does not belong to declared self”, then 500). The enclave now lists the customer’s saved methods (signed GET with queryParams) and names a saved Pix payee by its PaymentMethodID; a bank payee keeps its form (it carries the payout’s reference) and falls back to its saved method.

Signer WASM 0.2.1, sha256 6b0d3046c32a15404f2512d660c3fd613f76909109c950866d309436c4442130, on FastFS https://test.fastfs.io/euthyna-ops.testnet/outlayer.testnet/6b0d3046…2130.wasm, active version of project euthyna-ops.testnet/bank-signer (cargo build --release --target wasm32-wasip2 in bank-signer/)
Box key c5c6d26b84243488ef3b2f0efef3c05d4d99e45aa530e13e35f09bf06877bc66 (X25519), from the enclave’s pubkey output (sealedprod1106 proposal #26)
Secrets profile noah of project euthyna-ops.testnet/bank-signer, locked to the build: access And[Predecessor{Or[AccountPattern vaults, Whitelist[sealedprod1106 DAO]]}, WasmHash 6b0d3046…] (both hashes during the 0.2.0 → 0.2.1 switch, then only the new one); PROTECTED_NOAH_SEED generated in the enclave, never exported, kept across versions. The DAO is admitted only to read the public key: the code pays out for a vault only
Signer public key read through sealedprod1106’s DAO (proposal #37): MFkw…nod5Q== (P-256), attached to a Noah sandbox API key; box key 41ae950e…. Both stay the same for the project’s next versions
Earlier builds 528edf86… let a vault vote any partner customer id; 05ca8512… took the IBAN in clear; e263a0e2… paid SEPA only; 40db3075… paid a Pix payee only once. Their secrets rows are deleted and their Noah keys to revoke, so a vault cannot vote those hashes back
Vault version F4BZbfghE6CY6qQDU5pQZyBUspN3vKSAZYob3DLjnGML (contracts/res/vault.wasm, sha256 d0d44d4ab01edd864b1264dca97e67a13eab1017a1767ea1bc78c62297319c3f), published on euthyna-nomos.testnet (NEAR CxhAFbNeKvuu4BM48MD76qFHfDJsdHj625QeDwdTZL1R); sealedprod1106 moved its code source to that Nomos by vote (SetCodeSource, proposal #15) and upgraded by vote (proposals #16, #18, #19, #24, #27)
Console env BANK_SIGNER_URL, BANK_SIGNER_HASH, BANK_SIGNER_BOX_KEY, BANK_SIGNER_SECRETS_OWNER, BANK_SIGNER_SECRETS_PROFILE, BANK_SIGNER_PROJECT (env.example)
  • Sandbox only. In production Noah runs the KYB of each company (or relies on ours under a partnership); the code refuses a chain or mode it does not know.
  • Only Base settles: NEAR MPC verifies Base transactions for the vault; it does not verify Ethereum on testnet (get_available_foreign_chains on v1.signer-prod.testnet).
  • One euro payout at a time per vault (the signer’s answer is awaited before the next request).
  • Noah’s conversion fee (about 1 %) comes off the EURC amount: the IBAN receives the fiat_amount the signer reports, not the exact euros the agent named.
  • OutLayer’s TEE is the trust anchor for the partner key: its attestation is theirs to publish; the vault checks the WASM hash it voted, not the enclave quote.